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MANY

books and

hold that the

prove

that, after all,

it

mercy. sym]:)athy, and

name

YARROS

have been written by modernists

articles

way

S.

to vindicate or reinvigorate Religion

who
is

to

only inculcates the virtues of love, charity,
therefore,

that,

religion

merelv another

is

for morality.

In animadverting ujion this species of apologetic literature, a
British critic said recently with impatience,
is ii()t

"Commonplace moralitv

religion."

Xo. of course

on e.\|)ediency and
phrase
force, a

in

Commonplace morality

utility.^

A

commonplace morality not

Mohammedan

is

manifestly based

— would

different in

—using the

need, and en-

any respect from that

or Ruddhist societies.

the question arises: Is the

other words,

is

totally irreligious society

a con\entional or traditional sense

of C^hristian or
i'.ut

not.

/;/

her morality religion, or,

in

the higher morality possible without a religious basis

and sanction? By the "higher morality" we mean, as does every
body, certain manifestations of .Altruism, such as positive beneficence and self-sacrifice.
'It IS not to he doiiicd tliat even certain .Agnostics fall into the error of
claiming that religion is neither more nor less than ordinary, coinmoni)lace
morality.
They (|uote James' words, "Pnre religion and undefiled liefore God

and the h'ather is tlii^. To visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction.
and to keep himself unspotted from the world". Or they quote Jesus' "The
Kingdom of God is within you", and his etlrcal commandments and sayings.
What these interpreters overlook is the emphasis on religion in their quotaThe first of all the commandments, according to Jesus, is, "Love the
tons.
Lord thy Clod with all thy heart." Neither Jesus nor h's disciples dreamed
of the possihility of divorcing ethics and morality from religion. The fatherhood of Ciod was to them the primary and fundamental doctrine, and w'thout
lo\e and worship of Clod, love or charity for man was to them inconceivahlc.
.And certainly hetween their religion and llirir ethics there was no possihilily
of antagonism, whatever m;iy be the case with corrupt, oh.sole.scent. dogmaridden and superstitious religious systems.
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take the position that morals and religion are indissolubly
united, no difficulty presents itself, and the highest forms of altruism stand justified and explained. If all men are brothers, and this

we

If

brotherhood

is

based on the fatherhood of God, an omnipotent and

omniscient power and if love, service and sacrifice on earth are rewarded by eternal bliss hereafter, or by the supreme satisfaction
of knowing that in losing one's life, one finds it enhanced a thousand fold. then, indeed, no injunction of religion can be considered
to be alien to the potentialities and possibilities of human nature.
Having divorced morals from
But what of the Agnostic?
;

having affirmed that the phrase "fatherhood of God" is
without meaning to him. the Agnostic is compelled to supply new

religion

;

sanctions for morality in

all

its

essential aspects.

It is,

of course,

is no such thing as Agnosticism
(though there is relativity) in regard to morals. Societies cannot
It
live or grow without moral codes adjusted to their realized needs.
is almost inconceivable that society should permit or tolerate mur-

hardlv necessary to say that there

der, arson, theft, forgerv, rape, libel, malicious mischief, etc. Crimi-

moral codes. Even traffic codes are moral
and moral codes, as a rule, are rational. The freedom of any
individual in any civilized state viust be bounded by the equal free-

nal codes are primarily

codes,

dom

of

all

other individuals.

In making such affirmations as these

we

are assuming, of course,

that adequate moral codes are possibl-e without religious sanctions.

What

are they?

The Agnostic
siderations.

He

or skeptic will point,
will argue,

and

first

rightly,

of

all,

to utilitarian con-

that no rational person

will

defend murder, burglary, theft, etc., and, further, that if a society

were formed de novo, on a desert island, by Agnostics, there would
be virtual unanimity in favor of substantially the same moral code as
No supernatural or mystical
settled societies follow and enforce.
eLements are required to justify the familiar prohibitions of the
Expediency and Hedonism supply all the motives

criminal code.

and sanctions that are necessary.

Two

questions, however, arise at this juncture.

the so-called ahsohitc duties,

moral and

legal

— that

performance of which yields no reciprocal benefit?

First,
is,

what of

duties the

Why,

for ex-

from inflicting cruelty upon animals
creatures not members of our body politic? Or, again, why should
we treat criminals and outcasts of normal intelligence— and there

ample, should

we

refrain

:
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arc such, f^occ certain extreme schools of psvchiatry

and mercy

?

Why

should

prisons, extend parole

we

— with

humanity

abolish capital punishment, reform our

and prcibation laws

to

more and more offend-

ers?

The answer

of the Hedonist to these queries

In sjxirino^ animals, or in progressively

is

likely to be this

humanizing our treatment of

and pleasing ourselves. The more
more painful it is to us to contemplate pain
Our higher
suffered by others, e\en when the pain is deser\'ed.
Hedonism,
nature dictates forbearance, mercy and forgiveness.
accordingly covers absolute duties and mitigation of merited penThe second question is more difificult. Tt is this How can
alties.

we are
we are,

criminals,

really sparing

civilized

the

:

self-sacrifice

Hedonistic principles?

be justified on utilitarian or

\\h\ shoidd anvone give up his life for the sake of an idea or a
By what right does the secular or Agnostic state send men
to their death contrary to their own will and their own conception

cause?

of self-interest?

Herbert

what

Spencer grappled with these

his solution was.

He

believed in the

difficulties.

We

know

transmission by physical

or biological inheritance of certain acquired characters, as well as in
the operation in societies of the factor of natural selection.

He was

— though

on what we now see was rather inadequate evi
dence that man has long been gradually adjusting himself, and
being adjusted by unconscious evolution, to the completely social life.
He believed that there has been, and that there will continue to be,

convinced

—

evolution in

human

He

sentiments and emotions.

apparent, and for a time real, opposition between

believed that the

Egoism and Altru-

ism was slowly disappearing, and that ultimately "due egoism"
Because
will be achieved by giving pleasure and ser\ice to others.
of the postulated social and moral evolution, according to Spencer

—

"What n(i\v is occasional and feeble even in men of the highest nature may be expected to become habitual and strong, and what now
characterizes the exceptionally high may be expected eventually to
Imh' thai which the best human nature is capable
characterize' all.
of, is within the reach nf human nature at large."
Now, the li.cst Innnan ualure is capable nf self-sacrifice and oi
(Iclilici-atc

hest

nnscllisli

assumption of the gravest

natures self-sacrifice

is

risks.

spontaneous, not

calculations and balancing of advantages
fore, oil tlic thcorv of iiKK-liiiitr pcrft'iM

the

Indeed, in the
result

.and (lis.uhantages.
iliilit

\-

of

cold

There-

and iqtward develop-
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ment. even the averag^e
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pacity of self-sacrifice.

To
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being- will in time achieve the ca-

be sure, Spencer pauses to observe, in
a harmonious and full-grown society the occasions for anything like
serious self-sacrifice will be infrequent, since .extensive demands
on the superior, the benevolent and the altruistic members of society presuppose much misery, in justice and unhappin-ess, and these
conditions argue grevious lack of adaptation to a IJruly social
state.

he contends, the rare occasions for

Still,

sacrifice will pro-

duce keen competition for the privilege, as the satisfaction of the
impulse to sacrifice will be very highly prized.
This reasoning, however, involves some question-begging.

Why

docs moral or social evolution tend to produce capacity for selfsacrifice.
Because, the answer must be, it is impossible for societies
or nations to survive and flourish without that asset.

In the strug-

whose members lacked that impulse
and capacity, the theory is, would decline and pevish, while the more
fortunate societies, whose members were ready to make all manner
gle for existence the societies

of sacrifices for the general good, not excepting the sacrifice of

life,

would grow strong and possess the earth.
But has there ever been such competition among tribes and
Has any society permitted men to refuse to make sacristates?
fices for the general good ?
No nation or state is willing, or ever was
willing, to live by voluntar}' taxation, for example, or to relinquish
war-time conscription. No state has ever recognized what Spencer,
in his radical days, called " the right of the individual to secede",

to

refuse to pay taxes or serve in the

militia,

when

called

gists that the state

of non-resistants

upon

to

do

so.

We

would be stronger

and

pacifists

would be so dear and sacred to
chivalrously to its defense whenever
or enlightened states.

much?

What

No
is

the state at

There

is

or navy, or in the

some

sociolo-

did respect the scruples

if it

and exempted them from services

they conscientiously disapproved of.
state

army

are assured by

W^e are told that the free

men

fre.e

that they

would rush

it was threatened by less noble
some truth in this, but exactly how

one can know.
certain

is

this

—that

any risk or cost

the duty of the individual to serve

to himself

is,

and has been for ages,

inculcated by the churches, the statesmen, the moralists, the educators, the politicians

the artists.

and the

The pressure

publicists of

all

schools, as well as

of the social atmosphere

is

all

but

by
ir-
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Men

resistible.

feci that they

pulsion of the law

Only

in recent

is

The com-

have practically no choice.

supi)lemented by that of public opinion.

years has the doctrine been promulgated by so-

must deserve service and sacrifice, and
immoral or despotic state, or the wasteful and inefficient
This doctrine of
state, has no real claim on the individual citizen.
the moral basis of the state is, however, purely academic.
In practice every state appeals to force as the last resort, and is almost uni-

cial

radicals that the state

that the

versally upheld in that course.

]\Ien instinctively

bow

to the state

them any sacrifice it may
deem necessary. Individuals may question and assail the state's
policies
they may regard the sacrifices demanded of them in war
time, or in times of internal stress and danger, as unfair and vain.
They may charge the state with blunders and crimes, and attribute
and admit

its

right to rule

and

to require of

:

these to the egotism, vanity, ignorance or malice of

with brief authority. (But
or

wrong"

nearly

all

is

who

can doubt that

"My

men

clothed

country right

the perfectly spontaneous doctrine of most men, of

men,

in fact?

Can reason, logic, expediency, utilitv account for this attitude,
or must the explanation for it be sought in mystical and superrational or non-rational elements?

Let us see

how

we have

a great philosopher, Spinoza, dealt with the

and especially with the sanctions of ethics
between the individual citizen and the state. Of
course. Spinoza was a profoundly religious thinker and not a Hedonissues

and the

raised,

relation

Yet how does he fashion or justify his system
Does he invoke mystical sanctions? Does he treat the
supremacy of the state and of law as corollaries of the Fatherhood of
God and of the divine governance of the human world? By no
ist

or utilitarian.

of Ethics?

means.
Spinoza, in the fourth section of his Ethics, proceeds almost as
the
Tie

Greek philosophers did or as the English radical utilitarians did.
knows that concc])tions of right and wrong, good aiid bad, in

conduct arc the foundations of morality.

He

begins,

therefore,

with definitions of good and bad, and his definitions are very modern

and Hedonistic.

"Good." he says, "is that which we certainly know to be useful
and "bad that which we certainlv know will prevent us from
partaking of any good." By "us", we must assiune. Spinoza mean.s
those of us who are normal mentally and emoticMially, and whose
to us,"
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commend themselv.es
human beings.

to the

great majority of reasonable and well-balanced

Again

"The knowledge

:

of good and evil

"Since," continues Spinoza,

is

we

the .emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as

nothing else than

are conscious of

"man endeavors

to persist in

it."

his

being and to avoid pain and experience pleasure, what does reason

him

tell

as to the

means of

His answer

ness?"

is

realizing the

maximum

of possible happi-

we may condense

elaborate, but

man

it

as follows:

should love himself and seek

Reason postulates that each
what is truly useful to him that each should desire whatever leads
;

The

to a state of perfection.

basis of virtue

is

in action in

accord-

ance with the laws of one's nature, or the endeavor to preserve

what

one's

is

possessing

o^^'n.

many

Since, however,

cannot be achieved in isolation and in narrow self-indulgence.

])iness

Now,

there

nothing more useful to

is

preservation than that

pose the minds of
is

useful to

men would

all

them

with

all

all

all

than man.

excellent

Nothing,

for their

self-

should so agree that they com-

one mind, and

into

man

men more

therefore, can be desired by

what

we cannot be happpy without

desired things that are without us, virtue and hap-

as a body.

seek at the

all

Under

same time

the guidance of reason

which thev do not
mankind, and therefore they would be
just, faithful and honorable.
Even hatred and injustice should be
repaid with love and charity, for minds are conquered not bv arms,

then,

desire nothing for themselves

also desire for the rest of

And, although men are too often

but by love and magnanimity.

governed bv

evil

passions rather than by reason, they cannot

from

society,

and therefore

fail

more advantages than disadvantages

to recognize that they derive

it is

right

and wise to bear injuries with

equanimity and to promote only the institutions, customs and ways

which tend
will

It

rational,

to

produce

social

harmony and

social peace.

be seen that Spinoza finds no need for mystical, non-

supernatural elements in his ethical system.

Utilitarian

considerations answer every purpose of the social contract.

But so

no mention of any real self-sacrifice.
Spinoza speaks of bearing certain injuries with equanimity, because
for.

it

should be noted, there

is

the advantages conferred by organized society outweigh any ordi-

— for exmple, errors of
mob violence — and because

nary disadvantages

justice, or

weakness and

negligence in administration, or failure to protect a particular group
against
los.e

sporadic

infinitely

an individual would

more than he could gain by seceding from

society,

THE OPEN COURT

472

had that alternative. But what of ^ivino- one's life
Spinoza avoids this
for the good of society and at its command ?
question, perhaps because in his day it hardly presented itself. Yet
some of his remarks furnish a clue to his logical answer thereto.
assiimin<x that he

He goes on to argue that men. because of their passions, appetites
and short-sightedness, can only be made to refrain from inflicting
Society or the state does this it
evil by threats of greater evil.
prohibits certain courses of conduct and punishes them; it -enforces
obedience to law^ by threats, not by appeals to reason. The citizen,
In fact, "sin bethen, must feel that such obedience is necessary.
comes nothing else than disobedience, and is punishable by right of
;

the state alone," says Spinoza.
It

niav

from

be inferred

this

reasoning that

of the citizen to ob-ey an order of the state even
or losing his

inc/
is

life.

insecure and weak.

Without obedience, Spinoza
It

is,

is

it

ii'hcii

it

duty

ihe

means

risk-

says, the state

for the State, therefore, to determine

it are of a character and degree to
members.
it may be contended that, in advocating obedience to the
law and the state, and therefore to those who at any given time

when, or whether,

demand
Thus

])erils

self-sacrifice

of

facing
its

authorativelv speak for the State, Spinoza did contemplate sacrifice
as one of the obligations assumed by the tacit social contract, or by

memberslii])

organized society.

in

Spinoza, however, overlooks the fact that obedience to authoritv
is

not alxvays a sin, but, on the contrary,

may

be a virtue.

There

own

reaown
authority.
History
is reson and conscience, and the command of
From Socrates down to the Abolitionists
plete with such instances.
and the conscientious objectors, men of rectitude, courage and conviction have maintained that morality may be superior to law and
in ad\ance of it.
They have accepted the consequences of dis-

may

be a contlict between one's

sense of right, one's

obedience, but neither thcv nor their thoughtful fellow-citizens have

regarded them as simiers or criminals.
but the truth

is

one conceives

it,

that
to

an

Here

is

a seeming paradox,

self-sacrificing de\otion to truth, to duty as
ideal, in short,

than self-sacriiice, at the

command

is

nol)ler

and more courageous

of authority,

for the

common

good as interpreted by that authority. We may be sure that Spinoza,
if lie were writing to(la\-, would draw a distinction between organic
societ\- and the political state, and another distinction between selfsacrifice for the welfare of society as one conceives it and self-sac-

:
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rifice at

the

command

of

wield power for a time.
small voice, to one's

still,

ofificers
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and functionaries who happen

Tn other words, obedience to one's

own

sense of

rig^ht, is

to

own

often a higher vir-

tue than obedience to the state.

But obedience, self-subordination,

sacrifice,

form, are indispensable to society and to

est

altruism in the high-

human

progress.

The

philosophic utilitarian concedes this in theory as fully as the evolutionist of mystical proclivities.
It

to

must be admitted that the mystic and theologian are

argue that the Agnostic Hedonist

is

entitled

interpreting history to suit

and that it is impossible to prove that altruforms or degrees would have evolved in a society
totally untouched by mysticism and religion.
On the other hand, it
is equally open to the Agnostic and Hedonist to assert that, at
bottom, not faith in any supernatural factors, nor fear of divine
wrath, not yearning for divine love, not r-eligion, in a word, but
human needs and conditions, human emotions and sentiments born
of struggle and competition, satisfactorily account for altruism and
One may doubt whether this controversy will ever be
sacrifice.
his preconceived theory,

ism

in its highest

terminated by agreement.

What

the Agnostic and the philosophic Hedonist will never con-

cede, however,

is

the claim that without a religious sanction or -ex-

planation social and individual morality are of necessity reduced to

and simplest forms. It is sufficient to refer to Spinoza's
argument for a refutation of that contention. And to say, as
some did of the English Utilitarians, that they were finer than their
creeds, was merely to indulge in shallow, cheap sneers and patent
fallacies.
Men of all creeds, and no creeds, have been fine and noble.
Men build creeds, in the first place, although good and fine creeds
play a part in making and improving men.
In the making and remaking of creeds reason plays the controlling part, though it gives
full weight to sentiments and emotions.
It is an egregious error to
treat reason and calculation as synonymous terms.
It is a graver
the lowest
line of

mistake to

belittle reason.

In a recent book. Prof. Maurice Hutton, of Toronto University,
discusses the relative importance of reason and conscious

on the one hand, and religious mvsticism or

To

intuition,

Hedonism,
on the other.

quote a few typical sentences
"If a

man must be governed by

understanding,

understanding* of the lower things of

life,

it

will be

by the

for the highest things
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pass understanding^

man

\\"isdom a

of peace

:

(true peace), of

has a suspicion, a vision, a

Plato says, but not yet comprehension

he

And

sees, if at all.

logic,

of

a divination, as

'through a glass darkly'

upon

that life be based

reason and comprehension inevitably sinks into a basing of

common

on that

life

:

demand

therefore the

righteousness,

.s^leam,

sense 'which

intolerable without metaphysics',

is

I apprehend, removed
from jackass sense, and on materialism."
Prof. Hutton asserts that in the great and important actions men
are governed, not by reason, but by the indwelling sense of duty,
and that, pace the Greek thinkers, knowledge is not and cannot beget

on that hors-e sense which

The

virtue.

and

virtuous

only one degree,

is

man

does his duty because of a categorical

he discerns any personal adperformance of dutv.

intuitive imperative, not because

vantage to himself

in

These assertions contain a small element of truth, but only a
Psychologists and scientific ethicists do not admit
that reason supplies no warrant or sanction for acts of justice, of
There is joy and personal satisfaction
beneficence, of altruism.
small element.

in service

;

there

There

ure.

as Spencer contended, pleasure in sharing pleas-

is,

self-realization

is

appear unselfish service.

And

and self-expression

in

even when real sacrifice

is

what may
demanded,

—

—

not "horse sense," to be sure, but reflective reason has
no difficulty in accounting for the readiness to make such sacrifice
and for the spontaneous impulse to sacrifice.

reason

To

afiirm that reason cannot justify great actions, nobility of

conduct, and that the attempt to follow

egotism and crass materialism,

is

civilization enriches the individual

to

it

leads one straight to crude

denv. bv

and makes him

implicatiim,

that

freer, better

and

worthier than he could possibly be in a "state of nature", with
risks,

perils

Our

and

conclusion

is

two-fold.

In the

first j^lace, service,

sacrifice are facts, not m-ere ]>ossibilties.

science

its

suft'erings.

must account for them.

altruism,

P.eing facts, reason and

In the second place, the theory

of social evolutidii docs furnish a satisfactory explanation of those
facts.
tice,

the
is

Social evolution, obviouslv. might

bent-tkx'ncc

and

minds of men.

altrnisin,

even

if

and should produce jushad never dominated

ni\stioisni

.Xnd the evolutionary theory of social morality

strengthened by the abstract argument from

derstood, as S])inoza, for example, understood

We

do not know what the religion of the

utility prc^perly

un-

it.

futiu-e will be.

We

ETHICS

know

that science

superstitions

is

and of

WITH OR
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modifyin,^ religion and purging
verbal, meaningless terms.

475
it

of childish

But we know

also

that science fortifies social morality instead of undernvining it; that

science

urges

sobriety,

temperence, tolerance, humility,

co-operation, solidarity, sympathy, respect

and development of human

And

industry,

for personality, release

faculties.

They can dispense with the prop of mysticism and dogma, as can science.
these are of the essence of social morality.

